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When, if ever, is it more appropriate to frame causal explanations in terms of the former and when in terms of the latter?    
      In this paper, I will examine these issues within the framework of the account of causation and causal explanation worked out in my recent book, Making Things Happen (MTH). One of my themes will be that a great deal of philosophical discussion of these issues rests on mistaken assumptions about what it is for a relationship to be causal, about what is involved in providing a causal explanation, and about the role of generalizations in causal explanation. These mistaken assumptions involve an inter-related  complex of ideas, described below: a deductive-nomological (DN) conception of explanation according to which explaining an outcome is simply a matter of exhibiting a nomologically (or lawfully) sufficient condition for it (that is, deriving a description of the outcome from a “law” and a statement of antecedent conditions), an associated conception of causation according to which a cause is simply a condition (or a non-redundant conjunct in a condition) which  is  nomologically sufficient for its effect, and the assumption that the contrast between laws and non-laws is crucial to understanding causation and explanation. By replacing these assumptions with more acceptable alternatives, we will gain a more adequate understanding of the real empirical issues that surround the choice of levels of explanation in psychiatry. 
My discussion is organized as follows: Section 1 sets out my general framework for understanding causation and causal explanation. Sections 2 and 3 then discuss and criticize several arguments that attempt to show that upper level causal claims (e.g.   claims that  attribute causal efficacy to  mental or psychological states) and lower level causal claims involving neural or physical mechanisms are always in competition with each other, with the former automatically being undercut  and rendered false  by the latter. The conclusion of this section is that these arguments are misguided: causal claims at different levels do not automatically compete and when they do, there are cases in which upper level causal claims provide better explanations than lower level claims.  However, as Section 4 suggests, there are also cases with the opposite profile, in which lower level causal claims provide superior explanations. What level of explanation is most appropriate is an empirical matter, dependent, in ways that I will attempt to describe, on the details of particular cases.  
					
1.
1.1. An Interventionist Conception of Causation. MTH defends a manipulationist or interventionist account of causation: causal (as opposed to merely correlational) relationships are relationships that describe what will happen to some variables (effects) when we manipulate or intervene on others (causes). To say that a relationship is causal is to say that it is exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control in a way that merely correlational relationships are not. Given the goal of finding interventions that will improve patient’s mental health, there is an obvious reason why psychiatrists (and others) should care about identifying causal relationships in this sense. 
Consider an illustration from Blair et al (2005). These authors note that there is an association between damage to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex D (with accompanying impairment of executive function) and antisocial behavior A, but raise the possibility that this may occur not because damage to DLPFC causes anti-social behavior but rather because whatever insult I causes damage to DLPFC is also likely to causes damage to ventro medial and/or orbital frontal cortex V, with only the damage to VMPFC/OFC   causing   anti-social behavior. If so, Blair et al. remark, the “association between impairment of executive function thought to rely on the DLPFC and anti-social behavior is correlational rather than causal” (2005, p.86).  This suggestion may be represented graphically as follows:
Figure 1 here

This causal structure has a natural interpretation in terms of claims about what would happen if certain manipulations were performed.  For example, an appropriate   manipulation that alters D alone (e. g by damaging it in a normal subject) while leaving V undisturbed should not alter whether the subject exhibits anti-social behavior. By contrast, a manipulation   that damages V alone   in a normal subject while leaving D intact should change subject’s tendency toward anti-social behavior. 
Note that it is crucial to the logic of these claims that when we consider, e. g.,  a manipulation of V,   the manipulation must   not itself cause or be correlated with other causes  ( such as D) of  the  putative effect A  that are independent of  V .  Suppose, for example,  that   Figure 1  is  correct , but that we don’t know this and wish to learn whether  D causes A—that is, on the interventionist account, whether  A will change under an    appropriate manipulation of D.  One way of manipulating D would be to manipulate I. This would change the value of D in the population, but it would (obviously) not be a good experimental design for determining whether D causes A since this manipulation will also change V and hence confound any effect of D on A with the effect   on A of changing V. Instead,   we want   the manipulation to be such that the variation in D it introduces should be uncorrelated with or independent of other possible causes (such as V) of the putative effect A that are not themselves caused by D. In other words, we want the manipulation of D to be “surgical” in the sense that it affects only D and what is caused by D and does not at the same time change other possibly confounding variables.  A manipulation having these sorts of characteristics is called an intervention in the philosophical and statistical literature (See Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines, 2000, Woodward, 2003). If the structure in Figure 1 is correct, a genuine intervention on V will lead to changes in A but an intervention on D will not.
 1.2. Interventions. Giving a precise characterization of the notion of an intervention   turns out to be non-trivial and the reader is referred to MTH, Chapter 3 for details. For our purposes it will be enough to stick with the intuitive conception just illustrated: think of an intervention on one variable X with respect to a second variable Y as an idealized experimental manipulation of X which is well designed for the purpose of determining whether X causes Y, in the sense that it excludes various confounding possibilities such as those described above.  Very roughly an intervention I on X with respect to Y will be such that I causes a change in X, I does not cause a change in Y via some route that does not go through X, and I is exogenous in the sense of not itself having a cause that affects Y via a route that does not go through X. Depending on the system of interest, there are many different ways of carrying out interventions—in biological/ psychiatric contexts, these may include randomized experiments,   the use of gene knockouts in genetics, and precisely targeted surgical ablations (or other sorts of incapacitations such as those produced by TMS) of neural areas in animal models.
Given the notion of an intervention, it is straightforward to give a characterization of what it is for X to cause Y (or be causally relevant to Y) – I will use these notions interchangeably): 
(M) X causes Y if and only if were some intervention (where  the notion of an intervention is understood as above) that changes the value of X to occur, Y or the probability distribution of Y would change  in some regular, stable way,    least in some range of  background circumstances B.) 
As a further illustration of (M) consider the correlation between SES and various forms of mental illness: subjects with lower SES tend to have a greater prevalence of many forms of mental illness, including schizophrenia and depression (cf. Dohrenwend   et al.,   1992). The existence of these correlations raise  obvious causal questions: does (i) lower SES cause ( some particular form of) mental illness but not vice-versa (the “social causation” hypothesis) or (ii) does mental illness cause lower SES but not vice versa  (“social selection”) or (iii) is it perhaps true both that various forms of mental illness causally influence SES and vice-versa​[2]​?  Within an interventionist framework, these   possibilities correspond to different claims about the outcomes that would occur if various hypothetical experiments were to be performed. (i) suggests that if an intervention were to be performed that changes subjects SES (e.g. perhaps by provision of additional income, but see below), there would be a corresponding change in the prevalence of mental illness among those subjects but that if we were to perform an intervention that changes the incidence of mental illness (e.g. by successfully  treating these by various drugs or other therapies) there would be no change in subjects’ SES.  (Note that if these manipulations are to count as interventions, the additional income should not affect mental health directly but only through SES, and so on.) (ii) suggests the opposite profile while (iii) suggests that interventions on SES will be associated with changes in the prevalence of mental illness and that interventions that change the incidence of mental illness will be associated with changes in SES​[3]​. (In fact, according to Dohrenwald et al, 1992, the dominant direction of causation seems to be different for different illnesses. Low SES seems to play an important role in the etiology of depression, while schizophrenia causes a downward drift in SES.   Obviously, the question of which of these claims about the direction of causation between various forms of mental illness and SES   is correct has important policy implications. As the authors of a recent study put it, in a way that directly underscores the relationship between causal claims and claims about what will happen under interventions that is embodied in (M): 
In terms of policy, the question is important in determining whether intervention and prevention efforts should target socially based adversities that foster depression (e.g., poverty) or focus on protecting persons with mental illness from downward social mobility (e.g., by increasing access to treatment and services, reducing employment discrimination and social stigma, and favoring community integration).  (Muntaner et al. 2004, p.55)
 1.3. Implications of M. Returning now to the statement M above, it has several features which will be important to our subsequent discussion. First, it is important to recognize that M is intended as a characterization of what it is for X to cause Y. It is not claimed (indeed it is obviously false) that the only way to tell whether X causes Y is to experimentally intervene on X and see what happens to Y. Plainly one can sometimes learn about casual relationships by means of inference from passive, non- experimental observations -- e. g., by the use of various sorts of causal modeling techniques.  An illustration is provided by the path diagram in Kendler 2006 (see this volume pxxx) which is a proposal about the etiology of major depression, arrived at on the basis of structural equation modeling with    passive observational data, rather than by carrying out active experimental manipulations of the variables occurring in the model and observing how other variables change. None the less, this path model certainly makes claims about causal relationships.  What M claims is that to the extent that the relationships posited in the model are correct, they should accurately describe how variables will respond to hypothetical experiments in which interventions occur on the variables that are represented as their causes.   Thus, for example, the presence of an arrow in figure xx  from “dependent stressful life events in the last year” to “episode of major depression in the last year” amounts to the claim that an intervention that changes the incidence  of the former variable will alter the incidence of the latter, with the magnitude of this change  in standardized units being given by the associated  path coefficient—the path diagram is correct to the extent that this claim about what would happen under an intervention is correct​[4]​.  By contrast, the double headed arrows (which are intended in this context to represent correlation coefficients) carry no such implication – they are claims about “mere correlations”. Thus the double headed arrow connecting “genetic risk for major depression” to “childhood parental loss” does not imply that intervening to manipulate features of the subject’s genotype that increase the risk of depression will alter whether subject is likely to lose a parent.
1.4. Well-defined Variables.  A second implication of M is that for a variable to qualify as a legitimate causal variable within an interventionist framework, the notion of manipulating it must be well defined: it must be the sort of thing that it makes sense to think of as a target for an intervention and there must be a well-defined, unambiguous answer to the question of what will happen to other variables of interest under this intervention – that is, these other variables must exhibit a (somewhat) stable response to the intervention. Some variables that occur in candidate causal claims of interest to psychiatrists and psychologists may not meet this condition. Consider, again the notion of an intervention   on SES in connection with the mental illness example. Although income or wealth is one of the variables that usually goes into an index of SES, it is far from obvious (as I assumed in passing above) that merely providing subjects with a sizable (even permanent) income supplement will raise their SES in the relevant sense, in the absence of other sorts of changes in e.g., occupation, education, social network etc which are also   relevant to SES.   Relatedly, one may wonder whether alternative ways of intervening to set SES to some new level (e.g. changing income vs. changing occupation) are really likely to have the same effect on other variables of interest like the prevalence  of mental illness. (In fact, there is considerable evidence that income/wealth has a different effect on health, including mental health, than variables associated with occupational position​[5]​.)   To the extent that we are unsure what counts as an   intervention on SES or the results of such interventions seem to vary depending on whether it is income or occupation that we manipulate, SES will be not a well defined (or at least an entirely well defined) causal variable from the point of view of an interventionist approach to causation. 
We will return below to the question of what makes a variable “well-defined” but let me note at this point that one obvious response to the presence of an ill-defined variable is to disaggregate or disambiguate it into more specific, fine grained variables. Thus if changing SES by changing income is thought to have different effects than changing SES by changing occupation, this may mean that we should replace SES with two more specific variables, one measuring income and the other some aspect of occupation.  As we shall see, this is a consideration that sometimes (but not always or automatically) provides a motivation for preferring theories with more fine grained (“lower level”) variables to theories with more macroscopic, coarse grained variables – depending on the details of the case, the former variables may have a more well-defined notion of intervention associated with them.  To turn to a different illustration, there may be better defined notions of intervention associated with genetic, molecular, or biochemical mechanisms than with coarse grained psychological variables like low self-esteem.  To the extent this is so, an interventionist account will regard causal and explanatory claims formulated in terms of the former variables  as more satisfactory. 
1.5. Contrastive Focus. A third point to note about M is that it relates changes in the value of X to changes in the value of Y.  M thus implies that for X to count as a cause of Y, there must be at least two different values of X, x and x’, and two different values of Y, such that under an intervention that changes x to x’, the value of Y changes from y to y’.  This captures the intuition that whatever else a cause is, it must   make a difference to its effect: to say that a cause makes a difference to its effect implies that there must be  at least two possible states, corresponding to the cause being present or the cause being absent or to the cause being in one state rather than another such that which of these is realized is associated with  some change or difference in the state of the effect (the difference between the effect being present or absent etc.) Causal claims  thus have built into them the feature that philosophers call contrastive focus or “rather than” structure:  when we make the structure of a causal claim explicit , we see that   the real content of the claim is something like this: it is the contrast between X’s taking  some value x and its taking some different value x’ that causes the contrast between Y’s taking value y and taking some different value y’  . 
As an illustration, suppose that the display of a   red cape (of any shade of red) will cause  a bull to charge. This is naturally glossed in contrastive language  as the claim that the contrast between the cape’s being red  rather than not red causes the contrast between the bull’s charging rather than not charging.   However, note that as we vary the contrast within a causal claim, we may change both the meaning and truth-value of the claim.    For example, it is not true, in the above example, that the contrast between the cape’s being one particular shade of red rather than some other, different shade of red causes the bull to charge rather than not charge. This second claim involves a different contrast from the contrast implicit in the original causal claim. More generally, the causal claim that it is the contrast between X=x rather than X= x’ that causes the contrast between Y= y rather than Y=y’ will be a different causal claim, with a different meaning, from the causal claim that X=x rather than X= x’’ (where x’’  x’) accounts for this contrast. This is important because in many cases, some changes in the value of a variable will be associated with changes in the value of a second variable and other changes will not be – again, we make the content of the causal claim explicit by spelling this out (see immediately below for examples). 
When the contrastive focus of a causal claim is not made explicit, the usual, default convention is to interpret it as  claiming that it is the contrast between the presence of the cause and any  condition in which  the cause is absent (and no other potential cause of the effect is present) that causes the contrast between the occurrence of the effect and its absence. 
As a simple physical illustration, suppose that  platform that will collapse if and only if a weight greater than 1000 kg is placed on it.  Consider the claim that 
(1.5. 1) It is the fact that the weight on the platform was greater than 1000kg that caused the platform to collapse.
 (1.5.1) is naturally interpreted as the claim that it is the contrast between the weight being greater than rather than less than 1000kg that caused the platform to collapse –   a claim that is correct in the specified circumstances.  Suppose that  in these same circumstances, it was instead claimed that 
(1.5.2) the weight’s being 1600kg caused the collapse 
(1.5.2)  is   potentially misleading  since  it   is naturally interpreted as suggesting that  it is the contrast between the weight being 1600 kg rather than some different (presumably lesser) weight that accounts for the collapse. Once we recognize the contrastive character of causal claims, we see that, at the very least (1.5.2) is deficient, in comparison with (1.5. 1), in failing to communicate information about the conditions under which the platform would not have collapsed.  
Understanding the significance of contrastive focus is very important in connection with many causal claims in biomedicine—for example, those that involve threshold effects or systems which respond in a uniform way to stimuli in a certain range but not others. Suppose that an axon will discharge when and only when a stimulus S exceeds a certain threshold k*. If on some specific occasion or series of occasions, the stimulus takes the specific value k where k>k*, it will be (at best) misleading to cite this specific value as the cause of the axon’s discharging, for the same reason that the analogous claim is misleading in the platform example. Instead, it is more perspicuous  and accurate to  cite the fact that the stimuli are above the threshold (rather than below it) as the cause of the axon’s discharging rather than not discharging, thus making the correct contrastive focus of the claim explicit. Similarly, for a neuron or neural region (if there are such) that responds to human faces in upright position (that is, any human face) and no other stimuli. In this case, it is the contrast between the stimulus being a human face rather than not being a human face that causes the contrast between the response and the absence of any response at all. In such a case it is misleading to cite the particular face that may have been presented (e.g. Bill Clinton’s) as the cause of the firing because this suggests that it is the fact that the stimulus was Clinton’s face rather than some other face that is relevant to whether the region responds and we are assuming that this is not the case. Put slightly differently, the claim that it is Clinton’s face rather than some other human face that causes the response is a different causal claim that makes a different (and competing) claim about what would happen in a hypothetical experiment from the original causal claim.  If we want to learn which of these claims is correct, we can do the relevant experiments – present a non-Clinton but human face and see if the region responds.
I noted above that the demand that variables be well- behaved under interventions can sometimes generate a preference for causal claims involving more fine grained variables. We will see below that respect for the contrastive features of causal claims can sometimes generate an “opposite” (or at least quite different preference) for claims  that involve variables   that are more coarse –grained and less specific (variables that take values like “human face” vs. “not a human face”, rather than more specific values like “Bill Clinton” “George Bush”, etc. ).   More generally, one of the reasons why an appreciation of contrastive structure is so important is that it often has important implications for the choice of “level” of explanation. 
1.6. Pluralism about Levels. How these different considerations (some favoring the fine grained, some the coarse grained etc.) interact and the methodological recommendations they yield will depend on the details of specific cases.   This leads to the final point I want to note in connection with  M: it does not give automatic or apriori preference to any particular grain or “level” of causal description over any other. In particular, according to M, there is no barrier in principle to relatively upper level or coarse-grained variables being bona-fide causes as long as it is true that interventions that change their values are reliably and stably correlated with changes in their putative effects.  Thus if there is a well-defined notion of manipulating “humiliation” (H) and this is associated in a stable way with changes in depression D (at least for subjects with certain genotypes-- see below), then H will count as a legitimate cause of D, despite the fact that these are both relatively coarse-grained or upper level variables.  The interventionist account thus rejects the claim (which we might call  causal fundamentalism) that  we somehow know a priori, as a matter of principle, that variables like H are always causally epiphenomenal, with all of the “real causal action” going on at some lower, more fundamental level that needs to be specified in a much more fine grained way.   
 For similar reasons, on an interventionist account, there is no bar in principle to mixing variables that are at what might seem to be different “levels” in causal claims. Macro- variables can count as causes of micro-variables and vice-versa, as long as the right sorts of stable manipulability relationships are present. Thus if it is true, as it apparently is, that manipulating a monkey’s position in  a dominance hierarchy (e.g. by removing higher ranking animals)  will change his serotonin levels, then this will count as a case in which a “social” or environmental variable causally influences a “physiological” variable. Similarly, if interventions on serotonin levels are associated with changes in the monkey’s social behavior, this will count as a case in which a physiological variable causally affects a variable describing molar behavior. More generally, on a interventionist conception,  relatively coarse grained environmental events (e.g., maternal nurturing) can causally influence fine grained patterns of gene expression, which in turn can influence more macroscopic neural processes (e. g., heightened  activity in the amygdala) which in turn macroscopic mental or behavioral patterns – e.g., fearful behavior or depression. I stress these points because, as we shall see, alternative accounts of causation in the philosophical literature make it much more difficult to make sense of causal claims involving variables at more macro-levels and  also to make sense of inter-level causal claims. 
1.7. Laws, Generalizations, and Stability. I said above that for X to count as a cause of Y on the interventionist account there must be a “stable” or regular response of Y (or the probability distribution of Y) to some interventions on X, at least in some background circumstances. Some candidate causal claims will fail to satisfy this condition at all, for any interventions or background circumstances.  To return to our earlier example  in 1.1  suppose that D and V are correlated, but only because they are joint effects of the common cause I. Then any  intervention (in any background circumstances) on D will disrupt this correlation, making D  and V independent—in other words,   the association between D  and V is   not stable under any interventions on D. This sort of instability (or as I will sometimes also say non –invariance) is thus the mark of an accidental or merely correlational relationship, as opposed to a casual relationship.
Turning now to those relationships among variables that are stable under at least some interventions, in some background circumstances, we see that these may differ with respect to their degree of stability: Some relationships (and the generalizations that describe them) are stable under a wider range of interventions and under a wider range of background conditions than others.  At one extreme are relationships that hold under some interventions but only under a very restricted set of all possible interventions and/or only in very specialized background circumstances. These relationships (and the generalizations that describe them) count as causal (rather than merely correlational) on the interventionist conception because they can be exploited for purposes of manipulation and control, but they are highly sensitive or fragile:  everything has to be “just right” if we are to use them to manipulate. A mechanical example of such a relationship is the input/output relation instantiated by a very complicated Rube Goldberg type machine, the successful operation of which is extremely sensitive to environmental and other sorts of contingencies: if you intervene to pull on the cat’s tail with a force of just the right magnitude (neither too hard or too softly), it will produce a screech which is picked up by a microphone which upon activation transmits an electrical signal which (here many intermediate steps)… with the end result that a cigarette is lit​[6]​. Suppose that the nature of the apparatus is such that the cigarette will only be lit if the apparatus is within a narrow range of temperatures, there  are no background wind currents, the cat is in some appropriate physiological state, the tail pulling is just the right magnitude etc. The relationship  between pulling on the cat’s tail and the lighting of the cigarette that is instantiated by the apparatus is a genuinely causal (as opposed to merely correlational) relationship since under the right conditions, intervening to pull on the cat’s tail is a way of manipulating whether the cigarette is lit, but it is also a highly unstable or sensitive relationship. 
As a biological illustration of a relationship that is causal but relatively unstable,   consider a particular response pattern acquired through instrumental conditioning, as when a pigeon is trained to peck at  all red targets and only at such targets.  The  pattern of behavior so acquired – call it PECK – is such that we can use it to manipulate whether the pigeon will peck by intervening to present a red or alternatively non-red target. It thus is correct, on an interventionist account of causation, to think of the presentation of the red target as causing the pigeon to peck. None the less, the relationship PECK is obviously relatively fragile in the sense that it would not continue to hold if various background conditions were present— to take only the most obvious possibility, the pigeon might be conditioned to behave differently.  
As another  biological example, consider a gene Z with the following characteristics: when subjects possess a defective form they are unable to learn to read, when the possess the normal form (and when many other conditions, both genetic and environmental are satisfied, including exposure to a culture in which there is writing,  availability of appropriate instruction etc.) they do learn to read.  Richard Dawkins (1982), from whom this example is taken, claims that it is appropriate to think of the normal form of Z as “causing” reading. My remarks above suggest that there is something both correct and misleading about this claim. Dawkins is correct in the sense that the relationship   between  gene Z and reading is, so to speak, minimally causal rather than merely correlational—if all of the other necessary background conditions for acquisition of the ability to read are present, then it is true that manipulating whether some one possesses the normal or defective form of the gene is associated with a change in whether that person learns to read or not. On the other hand, the   gene Z reading relationship is relatively unstable in the sense that it is exploitable for purposes of  manipulation and control only in relatively specialized background conditions – change these very much and the relationship will break down. In particular, the gene Z reading relationship will break down not just under various changes that are internal to the subject such as changes elsewhere in the subject’s genome but also under various environmental changes such as changes in whether the subject is exposed to writing, receives   certain training etc. In this respect,  the gene Z reading relationship contrasts with other gene phenotype relationships, (such as the relationship between possession of an X rather than a Y chromosome and possession of various secondary sex characteristics) which are comparatively more stable.  
 Generalizations like  gene Z reading   contrast, in the extent of   their domains of stability, with the sorts of generalizations we naturally regard as paradigmatic laws of nature. Consider, for example, the field equations of general relativity. It is possible that these will be found to break down under certain very special conditions – at very small length scales at which quantum gravitational effects become important, but the current evidence is that they are stable   under all other possible interventions and changes in background conditions. They thus have a much wider range of stability/invariance than generalizations like gene Z reading.  A Similar point holds for other paradigmatic laws like the Newtonian laws of motion, Maxwell’s equations, the Schrodinger equation and so on.   
Other things being equal,  explanations that appeal to  more stable causal relationships  both provide more extensive possibilities for manipulation and control and often at least seem to provide better or deeper explanations – for one thing, such generalizations will often contribute   information about  more extensive patterns of dependence linking explanans and explanandum​[7]​ variables (than what is contributed by less stable generalizations).   They are thus  able to figure in the answers to a wider range of what-if-things-had-been-different questions (see below). Thus, a generalization like gene Z reading strikes us as explanatorily shallow: we get little or   insight into why or how subjects come to read if we are told merely that they have the gene Z for reading.  By contrast, more stable generalizations   strike us as providing much deeper understanding and of course much more information relevant to manipulation.
 We may think of generalizations like  gene Z reading and laws of nature as, so to speak, at (nearly) opposite ends of a continuum of stability. Where do typical causal generalizations (or at least the sorts of generalizations we might reasonably hope to discover) in psychology, psychiatry and bio-medicine lie on this continuum? I suggest they lie somewhere between the two extremes described above. On the one hand, it seems clear that most if not all such generalizations are contingent on some   specialized background conditions and will break down or have exceptions if these conditions are not satisfied. Even  causal processes and relationships that are of fundamental importance in biological contexts such as  the mechanisms of DNA replication,  or the mechanisms underlying the generation of the action potential, obviously require the presence of various sorts of background machinery and conditions and will break down when these are no longer operative. This is reflected in the tendency of biologists, psychologists etc. to eschew or downplay references to  “laws”  and instead use words like “cause” (or more specific versions of this word like “inhibits”, “excites” and so on), “mechanism” , “principles” (when referring to causal generalizations) and so on. I take these linguistic practices to be an acknowledgment that although these disciplines claim to discover causal relationships, these relationships typically lack the sort of universality, near exceptionlessness, and unconditionality we associate with fundamental laws of nature.  
   On the other hand, it seems reasonable (and achievable) goal in psychiatry and psychology to aim at the formulation of generalizations and causal relationships that (while they inevitably have some exceptions) are not as highly unstable as generalizations like  gene Z reading  and PECK.  In other words, one may hope to find generalizations at, so to speak, an intermediate level of stability.   As   a first  illustration of what this might involve, consider  a generalization  like the Rescorla- Wagner rule that describes the conditions under which and the rate at which  classical conditioning will occur. In contrast to PECK, which may be disrupted simply by a change in training history, generalizations like Rescola-Wagner are stable under a range of different training histories, even if they are far from exceptionless: they are  thus more fundamental than generalizations like PECK or gene Z reading. 
As a second illustration, consider  the generalization describing the genetic basis for Huntington’s disease​[8]​. This disease  is caused by abnormalities in a gene (called huntingtin) on the short arm of chromosome four—those who develop the disease have  a form of the gene with an abnormally large number of CAG repeats. The probability of developing the disease is linked to the number of repeats with   those who have more than forty repeats having a virtual certainty (or at least an extremely high probability) of developing Huntington’s (provided of course that the possessor does not die of something else prior to the onset of the disease).  The relationship between, on the one hand,   possession of an abnormal form of  the huntingtin gene in which there more than 40 CAG repeats  and, on the other,  development of Huntington's disease is  very stable in the sense that sense that if you have this abnormal form of the gene, you have a very high probability of getting  Huntington's disease no matter what else is true of you-- it doesn't matter what else is in your genotype, or  what your environment is.   On my view, this relationship thus furnishes   more satisfactory explanations than the  gene Z reading relationship.
It  may help to deepen our understanding of the notion of stability to distinguish it from the notion of  the scope or breadth of a generalization. The scope of a generalization has to do with whether it applies to a large range of different kinds of systems – that is, with how widely or broadly it applies.  Newton’s  gravitational inverse square law has, intuitively, very wide scope since it applies at least approximately to any system of masses anywhere in  the universe. Darwinian natural selection is a theory that has relatively large scope in the biological realm since it applies in principle to all living things with heritable variation in fitness. By contrast, a generalization has relatively narrow scope if it applies only to some very special or specific set of systems, rather than very generally.  The generalization describing the genetic causes of Huntington’s has  relatively narrow scope in this sense since it concerns  the role of abnormalities in a specific gene in producing a particular form of illness. Note, though, that this  relative narrowness of scope is compatible with this generalization being very stable; the generalization may apply only to a very specific sort of system but it holds over all sorts of changes or variations in  the background circumstances in which that system may be found.
Suppose  that (as I think plausible) that  many of the generalizations that we  are   able to frame in psychiatry turn out to have relatively narrow scope.  One reason why the distinction between stability and scope matters is that this scenario is consistent with those generalization’s  being relatively stable and thus having, on my view, significant explanatory power.   Put slightly differently, while generality of scope is unquestionably a desideratum in theory construction , on the interventionist   view  this is not the only desideratum; sometimes it will make sense to prefer generalizations that are  relatively  narrow in scope  but highly stable to generalizations of greater breadth and scope that are less stable​[9]​. 
As  a final illustration of the notion of stability,  consider the relationship between stressful life experiences, particularly those that have a social dimension and involve humiliation, and the depression.  As  Campbell (this volume) notes, it is  widely believed that  genetic differences cause different people to  have different propensities  to develop depression in response  to stressful experiences. Although several papers have reported a failure to replicate one of the best known specific proposals about  the genetic basis for this difference (that it is due to a polymorphism in the promoter regions of the serotonin transporter   5-HTT gene)​[10]​, let us assume, for the purposes of illustration, that there is some genetic factor   which influences the  relationship between stress and depression, in  the sense that those with genotype G are much more likely to develop depression D in response to certain kinds of stress S than those with a different genotype G’. Although the relationship S D between stress and depression is not stable under variations in genotype, it may well be that for both those with genotype G and those with genotype G’,  the S D relationship is    stable (at least qualititatively) under many other sorts of alterations in background conditions: e.g. it holds for people of different ethnicities and backgrounds, living in quite different circumstances,  and so on. To the extent this is so,  the S D relationship will at least be more stable than  the    gene Z reading relationship even if it is less stable than the relationship describing the genetic basis for Huntington’s disease.​[11]​   
1.7. Stability vs. Laws. This view (that generalizations can differ in degree of stability and that this matters for the quality of   the explanations in which the generalizations figure) differs sharply from what might be described as the received view in philosophy about the role of generalizations in explanation. According to the received view, there are just two, mutually exclusive possibilities: either a true generalization is a “law of nature” or else it is “accidental” and describes a mere correlation. Thus, to the extent that generalizations in psychiatry   are not merely correlational and do seem to describe casual relationships, they must be  regarded as  laws.   Similarly for generalizations like  gene reading and PECK above. 
It is widely recognized that this way of thinking about causal generalizations creates some serious dialectical difficulties. For one thing, philosophers have generally supposed that paradigmatic laws are exceptionless (or as they are often called in the literature “strict”).    It is also generally agreed that  in what philosophers call the “special sciences” (roughly every area of science outside of physics and chemistry, including the biological sciences, psychiatry, psychology, and the social sciences)  typical  causal generalizations   are very  far from being exceptionless and lack many other characteristics commonly assigned to laws.  How then can these generalizations qualify as laws? The standard response is to claim that   such generalizations   are   laws of a special kind, called “ceteris paribus” (cp) laws, which describe relationships that that hold, “other things being equal”. On this view, the proper way of thinking about the generalization “Humiliation causes depression” is to construe it as the “law” that “other things being equal, humiliation is followed by depression”.   
  There is, however, an obvious problem with this proposal:  some  further explication of the  “other things being equal”  clause is required if cp laws are to avoid the charge of vacuity. (The worry is that without such an explication, the proposed ceteris paribus law amounts to nothing more than the claim that As are followed by Bs except when they aren’t.) There have been many attempts to provide such an explication but for various reasons (see Earman et. al, 2002, Woodward, 2002, 2003) they have been unsuccessful. But even if this difficulty could be overcome, there is a more fundamental objection to this proposal. It does not allow us draw the kinds of distinctions (with respect to degree of stability etc.)   among true causal generalizations that have exceptions that we need to be able to draw – all end up in the catch- all category of ceteris paribus laws. For example, on this approach, the generalizations  gene Z reading and PECK  as well as   more stable relationships like Rescola –Wagner and   the generalization describing the genetic basis of Huntington’s disease  all are classified together as ceteris paribus laws, despite the important differences among these generalizations.  In other words, the “ceteris paribus laws” approach does not have the resources to distinguish between causal generalizations that are shallow and superficial and those that are of more fundamental interest, as long as both have exceptions (and, to repeat, all generalizations in the special sciences will​[12]​.) 
At this point the reader (especially if he or she is not a professional philosopher) may well wonder what the motivation is in the first place for trying to construe causal generalizations in the special  sciences as laws of any kind, whether strict or ceteris paribus. Why try to shoehorn such generalizations into a category which they don’t seem to fit very well?  Several factors are at work. Until recently, the law vs. accidental generalization dichotomy has been   the only framework philosophers have had for thinking about the status of generalizations that describe true causal relationships but also seem to have exceptions.  Because such generalizations do not describe mere correlations, philosophers have thought that treating them as laws of some kind is the only   alternative. 
  Another strong motivation has been a widespread commitment to philosophical theories that take the notion of law to be crucial to understanding causation and explanation. It is widely believed that all true causal claims must “instantiate” or be backed by laws—this is often described as the thesis of the nomological character of causation, “nomological” being a philosophers term of art for “lawful”. On this view, a cause is just an event or property that is a nomologically sufficient condition (or a part or conjunct in such a condition) for its effect: C causes E if and only if there is a law stating that when C occurs (and perhaps certain other conditions are met) E always follows.  Explanation is understood along similar lines: explanation of an outcome consists in the exhibition of a nomologically sufficient condition for the outcome. This is the heart of the DN model of explanation, discussed briefly below. On such law-based accounts of causation and explanation, it again seems natural (even unavoidable) to insist that if a generalization   describes a genuine causal relationship and figures in explanations it   must be regarded as a law. 
The interventionist account of causation and causal explanation undercuts this motivation by insisting that we should think of causal relationships as connected to the notion of stable or invariant relationships rather than laws. Causal explanation does not require laws or the identification of nomologically sufficient conditions but rather simply generalizations that describe relationships that are stable under some appropriate range of interventions and changes and that allow us to see how changes in the explanandum​[13]​   are systematically connected to changes in the explanans.     
More specifically, according to the interventionist conception, we provide a causal explanation of an outcome by citing causal information that can be used to answer what- if –things- had- been -different questions: we identify conditions under which the explanandum-outcome would have been different, that is, information about  changes that  might be used to manipulate or control the outcome.  Ideally an explanation should cite all and only those factors such that changes in them change or make a difference to the explanandum – it is exactly these factors that are casually or explanatorily relevant to the explanandum. 
 We have already noted that one way in which the interventionist account differs from the DN model is that it does not require that a successful explanation cite laws. A second difference is that  the DN model does not impose the requirement that a successful explanation answer   what- if things –had- been- different questions.  As a result, the DN model allows pseudo-explanations that cite factors that are explanatorily irrelevant to their explananda in the sense that changes in these factors are not associated with and make no difference to changes in their explananda. Thus, in a well- known example due to Wesley Salmon, citing the fact that Jones, a male has taken birth control pills and  the “law” that all men who take birth control pills fail to get pregnant provides a nomologically sufficient condition (and a DN style derivation) of Jones’ failure to get pregnant but is intuitively no explanation. The interventionist model identifies the crucial factor that is missing: Jones’ taking birth control pills is causally and explanatorily irrelevant to his failure to get pregnant because changes in this factor are not associated with (make no difference for) changes in whether he gets pregnant. As this example illustrates, citing a nomologically sufficient condition is not the same thing as answering a “what if things had been different question” or identifying a factor that is causally relevant to an outcome. This observation will turn out to be crucial to understanding how explanations at some levels can be more powerful or appropriate than explanations at other levels. 
						2. 
2.1 Mental Causation.  I turn now to a closer look at the implications of the framework described in Section 1 for how one should think about causation and explanation in psychiatry and psychology. I will focus particularly on the question of whether it is appropriate to think of “mental” or psychological states as genuine causes (of either other mental states or behavior), although many of my conclusions will be applicable to the reality of “upper level” causation more generally.  A number of philosophers have argued for a negative answer to this question, claiming instead   that all the causation apparently associated with mentally states “really” occurs at some “lower” level (e.g. physical,   biochemical, neural) and must be understood in terms of mechanisms specified at these levels.  Although there may appear to be  causal relationships between mental states, these turn out upon more careful analysis to involve  mere correlations between causally inert or epiphenomenal items, where these correlations   are produced by causal actors at a more fundamental level. 
  Jagewon Kim gives a clear statement of this view in the following description of the relationship between mental states [M, M* below] and the physical states [P, P*] that underlie them or on which they “supervene”​[14]​: 
P is a cause of P*, with M and M* supervening respectively on P and P*. There is a single underlying causal process in this picture, and this process connects two physical properties, P and P*. The correlations between M and M* and between M and P* are   ….regularities arising out of M’s and M*’s supervenience on the causally linked P and P*. These observed correlations give us an impression of causation; however, that is only an appearance, and there is no more causation here than between two successive shadows cast by a moving ear or two succession symptoms of a developing pathology. There is a simple and elegant picture, metaphysically speaking, but it will prompt howls of protest from those who think that it has given away something very special and precious, namely the causal efficacy of our minds. Thus is born the problem of mental causation. (2005, p 21).  
 To clarify what is being suggested in this passage it may be helpful to consider the following diagram. 
Figure 2 here
Here the double-headed vertical arrows from P  to M and from P* to M*  represent  the fact that M supervenes on P  and M* supervenes on P*. The ordinary horizontal arrow from P to P* represents the fact that P causes P*. The absence of such an arrow from M to M* corresponds the fact that there is no causal relationship between these two mental states: M and M* are correlated but, as Kim says, only because both supervene on the physical states P and P*, which is where the real causal action resides.  
We noted above that the interventionist conception allows “upper level” factors or variables to be causally efficacious under the right conditions.  It similarly seems to provide prima-facie support for the claim that “mental” or psychological states can be bona-fide causes, both of behavior and other mental states, including states that we associate with mental illness.  It certainly seems as though we sometimes intervene on both the mental states of others and perhaps our own mental states as well and in many circumstances these interventions in turn seem to be stably associated with changes in other mental states and in behavior. If these appearances are correct, then, on an interventionist conception, this is all that is required for genuine mental causation.
2.2. Examples of Mental Causation. Apparent examples of mental or psychological causation in this interventionist sense seem ubiquitous in common sense contexts. Suppose that I promise aloud to you that I will pay you $1000 to paint my house. Then I seem to be trying to manipulate your beliefs – to induce you to believe that I will pay you for performing this service in circumstances in which at least typically you had no such belief prior to my promise. Furthermore, I hope that his change in belief will cause changes in other beliefs of yours and in your behavior – e.g. I hope that this change in belief will (help to) cause you to begin painting the house. If you do paint the house, why should we not think of this behavior as caused, in part, by the new belief that I induced in you? Similarly, suppose that I successfully deceive you so that you act in a way that is to my financial advantage. Is this not a matter of causing you to hold some false belief which in turn causes you to behave in certain ways?  
These are everyday, common sense cases but mental causation in the interventionist sense doesn’t seem confined to such contexts. Certain kinds of psychotherapy of a relatively cognitivist variety seek to alter patients’ behavior and affect in part by altering their beliefs. For example, patients who are depressed are encouraged to think positive self- affirming thoughts about themselves and to avoid thoughts that present them selves in a negative, self- belittling light. It is an empirical fact, revealed in numerous randomized experimental trials, that in some patients such therapy can be effective in alleviating depression (and significantly superior to “placebo” conditions such as being on a “waiting” list) , even in the absence of medication. It seems very natural to think of this as a case in which changes in a patient’s beliefs or thoughts about themselves (whether induced by the therapist or the patient themselves) cause changes in emotional experience. For purposes of comparison, consider other mental illnesses/ disorders such as schizophrenia.  In this case, randomized experiments in which some subjects with schizophrenia are exposed to psychotherapy and other schizophrenics are not, there appears, in most studies,  to be no stable differences between the two groups in the alleviation of core symptoms.  Those holding an interventionist conception of causation will take such results to suggest that psychotherapy does not cause changes in the mental states and behavior associated with  this illness. In both cases, however, on an interventionist conception, it is an empirical question, to be decided by experimentation or some other means, whether exposure to psychotherapy causes changes in subjects thought patterns which in turn cause changes in behavior. This question cannot be answered in the negative on the a priori grounds that beliefs and thoughts can never be causes of anything. 
				          3.  
Although the notion of mental causation  thus seems, at least on the surface,  unproblematic from an  intervenentionist perspective, the philosophical literature, as I have already noted,  is full of arguments to the contrary—  arguments that purport to show that mental states or properties cannot (ever) cause other mental states or behavior. Some of these arguments are very intricate, and likely to be of interest only to professional philosophers. In what follows, I will try to eschew technicalities and just give the reader a general sense of some of the considerations that have been taken to support the this conclusion   and why in my view they are  unconvincing.  
	3.1. Multiple Realizability. First, however, some brief stage setting is necessary. The current orthodoxy in philosophy about the relationship between the mental/psychological and the neural or physical (I will use these terms interchangeably) is that mental states are “multiply realized”. What this means is that a number of different physical states and/or neural states may and typically do correspond to or realize or serve as the substrate for the same mental state.  Different philosophers have different expectations about how much (or what sort of) variability of this sort should be expected. One relevant possibility is variability of realization of the same (type of) mental state within a single person over time or on different occasions. It may be, for example, that my intention I  to reach for a grape at time t is realized by some physical or neural state P1 and that same intention I, formed at some later time t’ is realized by some somewhat different physical state P2.  (See below for why I have chosen this particular example.) Similarly, there may be variability of realization across people -- the neural state that realizes the intention to reach for a grape in you (on a particular occasion or more generally) may be different from than the neural state or states that realize this intention in me. Finally, and more radically, many philosophers are prepared to countenance the possibility that if there should exist sufficiently cognitively sophisticated creatures or machines   with a very different biology or  material composition from humans,  then  the “same” beliefs and other mental states  might be realized in them in very different ways than in humans.
  It is usually supposed that if mental states are multiply realizable then this rules out the possibility of any theory according to which types of mental states or mental properties are identical with types of physical states or properties. If the belief that the Pythagorean theorem is true   is realized  one way (in a certain neural structure or class of such structures) in humans and a very different way in silicon-based Martians, then (it is supposed) there will be no common physical structure or property, holding across these two set of creatures to identify with this belief​[15]​.  
	What is the bearing of the doctrine of multiple realizability (herafter MRT) on issues of mental causation?    The doctrine  was seen by its original proponents, like Fodor and Putnam, as a way of preserving the autonomy (and causal efficacy) of the mental​[16]​,   but more recently a number of philosophers (e.g., Kim, 2005) have argued that MRT undercuts or at least is in considerable tension with the idea that there is such a thing as mental or psychological causation. In what follows I   explore some of these arguments.  
3.2. The Preference for Fine- Grained Causal Explanations. One motivation for skepticism about assigning any causal role to the mental derives from the assumption of MRT combined with the thought that there is a general preference for detailed or fine grained or more micro level causal claims (or explanations) over less detailed, more macro claims. Suppose that my intention I  to reach for a grape on some particular occasion is followed by  my reaching  for that grape (Call this behavior R) . The intention I is described in a common sense psychological way  but according to the doctrine of multiple realizability  I  will be realized in the brain on any particular occasion by some complex neural/physical structure  P.   Suppose, furthermore, that P  is by itself  “nomologically sufficient” for the occurrence of R, given the rest of the condition of my brain – that is,   it follows, as a matter of law,  from  the occurrence of P and the rest of the condition of my brain that R must occur.  (This assumption will be plausible if the brain is (or is nearly) a deterministic system.) Then, one argument goes, given the greater detail of P, why isn’t it at least preferable and perhaps mandatory to explain R in terms of P rather than I?  Or, as an alternative route to the same conclusion, why can’t we argue as follows: since, given the condition of the rest of the brain, P is nomologically sufficient for R, why do we need to bring I into the picture at all? If P by itself is “enough” for R (in the sense of being sufficient for it) , it looks as though there is “no causal work” left over for I to do and that I is redundant or causally idle​[17]​. (This is a version of the so-called causal exclusion argument according to which the causal role of P in bringing about R excludes any causal role for I)
	To explore the cogency of this reasoning,   consider some other examples involving a choice between more or less fine-grained causal information.   Stephen Yablo (1992) describes the case (already briefly encountered in Section 1) of a pigeon which has been trained to peck at a target when and only when presented with a red stimulus (that is, a stimulus of any shade of red). Suppose that on some particular occasion, the pigeon is presented with a    particular shade of scarlet and pecks at the target. Consider the following two causal claims/causal explanations;  
(3.2. 1) The presentation of a scarlet target caused the pigeon to peck 
(3.2..2) The presentation of a red target caused the pigeon to peck.  
There is an obvious sense in which (3.2.1) seems inappropriately specific or insufficiently general, in comparison with (3.2. 2). Or at least, to make a much weaker claim, it does not seem plausible that (3.2.1) should be judged superior to (3.2. 1) just on the grounds of its greater specificity. (It is true, as noted, in 1.7 that the red target pecking relationship is relatively unstable but the pecking  scarlet relationship is equally unstable, so considerations of stability provide no grounds for preferring the one to the other) Moreover, even if we accept ((3.2.1) as a true causal claim, it seems misguided to regard it as in competition with (3.2. 2) in the sense that acceptance of the former requires us to regard the latter as false or that the truth of the former “excludes” the latter.  The basis for these assessments falls naturally out of the interventionist account of Section 1. What we are usually interested in when we ask for a cause or causal explanation   of the pigeon’s pecking is something that accounts for the contrast between the pigeon’s pecking rather than not pecking at all. There is relevant information about  this contrast—about the conditions under which both pecking and not pecking will occur -- that is conveyed by (3.2. 2) but not by  (3.2. 1 ).  The default reading of (3.2.2) with its contrastive focus made explicit is: 
(3.2.2)	The contrast between the target’s being red rather than not red causes the contrast between the pigeon’s pecking rather than not pecking. 
(3.2. 2) thus tells us for example, that if the target had been some other shade of red besides scarlet the pigeon still would have pecked and that  for the pigeon not to peck we must produce a target that is not red at all. (Note also that this has a straightforward interventionist interpretation in terms of what will happen under interventions that change the color of the target from red to not red.) By contrast, the default reading of (3.2. 1) is:   
(3.2. 1 ) The contrast between the targets being scarlet rather than not scarlet causes the contrast between the pigeon’s pecking rather than not pecking.  
Interpreted as claiming that the pigeon will not peck if the target is not scarlet (but still red) (3.2.1) is false. Even if we find this default interpretation uncharitable, it remains true that (3.2. 1) tells us less than we would like to know about the full range of conditions under which the pigeon will peck or not peck. In this sense, (3.2.1) conveys less causally and explanatorily relevant information than (3.2..2), despite invoking a causal factor (the target’s being scarlet) that is in some obvious sense “more specific” that the causal factor to which (3.2.2) appeals.
	How is it possible for (3.2.1) to convey more specific information and yet be a less good or accurate explanation than (3.2.2)? The broad outlines of the answer to this question were given by Wesley Salmon many years ago (see, e.g. Salmon, 1984. pp 92ff) when he observed that citing factors that are relevant to the explanandum is at the heart of successful explanation and that the addition of causally irrelevant information to an explanation can make it a less good explanation (or even no explanation at all), even though this also may make the explanation more specific and detailed. In other words, when it comes to explanation, what matters is not detail and specificity per se but relevant detail and specificity. Recall that within the interventionist framework, (i) a factor is causally and explanatorily  irrelevant if variations in its values (when produced by interventions) are not associated with any changes in the value of the explanandum-phenomenon.  In addition, (ii) we also want to cite explanans factors variations in the value of which (when produced by interventions) are associated with the full range of variation in the explanandum outome and which do not misleadingly suggest that certain variations will be associated with changes in the explanandum outcome when this is not the case. The possibility of complete irrelevance (i) is illustrated by the birth control pills example described in Section 1. Causal claims/explanations like (3.2. 1) illustrate the importance of desideratum (ii) which can also be thought of as requirement that excludes causally irrelevant information (in this case information that is overly specific in the sense illustrated by (3.2.1)) . Both (i) and (ii) are at the heart of the what- if- things- had been- different conception of explanation:   a good explanation should cite factors variations in the value of which (when produced by interventions) are associated with the full range of variation in the explanandum phenomenon that we are trying to account for and it should cite only such factors. 
Returning to the pigeon example, note that under the imagined conditions, the presentation of the scarlet target is nomologically sufficient (or at least part of a nomologically sufficient condition) for the pigeon to peck, given the way that the philosophical literature understands the notion of “law”.     This again illustrates the point that there is more to successful explanation or informative casual claims than the provision of nomologically sufficient conditions or the construction of DN explanations. 
Note also that under a different experimental set-up in which the pigeon was instead trained to peck only in response to the target’s being scarlet, it would be natural to regard (3.1.2.1) as   true and (3.1.2.2) as false. This again underscores the point that we should think of (3.1.2.1) and (3.1.2.2) as   different causal claims, having different implications about the manipulability relationships or the patterns of   dependency that hold in the situation of interest: (3.1.2.1) claims that we can manipulate whether the pigeon pecks by changing the target from red to not-red, while (3.1.2.2) claims that merely changing whether the target is scarlet will do this.  If this is correct, there can be no general preference for (3.1.2.2) over (3.1.2.1) simply on grounds of its greater specificity – the appropriateness of each will depend on such facts as whether the pigeon pecks in response to non scarlet shades of red.  
What does this have to do with mental causation? My contention is that at least sometime claims about mental causation and its relationship to underlying physical or neural states are relevantly like the red/scarlet example.   Consider some research concerning the neural coding of intention to reach carried out by Richard Andersen and colleagues at Caltech (Mussalam et al. 2004)​[18]​. They recorded from individual neurons using arrays of electrodes implanted in the PRR (parietal reach region) of the posterior parietal cortex in   macaque monkeys. Previous research had suggested that this region encodes what Andersen et al.  call intentions to reach for specific targets – that is higher order plans or goals to reach toward one target or goal rather than another (e.g., an apple at a specific location rather than an orange at some other location) rather than more specific instructions concerning the exact limb trajectory to be followed in reaching toward the target   – the latter information being represented elsewhere in motor areas. Andersen  used a data mining program to learn how variations in the recorded signals were systematically associated with variations in intentions to reach for specific goals, as revealed in reaching movements.  After several months, this program was able to accurately forecast where the monkeys would reach toward one of eight positions at which an icon was located some 67% of the time as opposed to the 12% prediction rate that would be obtainable by chance.  
 One of Andersen’s goals is to enable paralyzed subjects to use the neural signals encoding intentions to direct a prosthetic limb toward one or another goal. That is, his hope is that such subjects could control the goals toward which a prosthetic limb would be directed by forming different intentions, which would then be decoded, the resulting neural signals directing the limb. From an interventionist perspective, this is as about as clear a case of mental causation as one could imagine: the subject’s having  intention I1 to reach for some goal rather than the different intention I2 to reach for a different goal causes movement of the limb toward the first goal rather than another – the subject uses her intentions to manipulate the position of the limb. Presumably one could also in principle run this whole procedure backwards -- if we were to introduce the right pattern of activation exogenously in the PRR of a normal, non-paralyzed subject, this would cause reaching behavior.  
Let us consider the causal structure of this example in a bit more detail. The signals that were recorded  in Mussalam et al. 2004 were the firing rates (spikes / second) over a temporal period from a number of individual neurons which were then aggregated​[19]​.  Suppose that a particular monkey forms the intention to reach for a certain goal on several different occasions At this point it is not known to what extent the  pattern of neural firing down to the behavior of   individual neurons varies across these occasions​[20]​.  One  extreme possibility is that the pattern of firing at the level of individual neurons   (that is, not just firing rate but the exact temporal characteristics of the signal is exactly  the same on each of these occasions.  Another, arguably more plausible possibility is that what matters to the realization of the same intention is  some function of the   aggregate behavior  of many neurons taken together   and that   sameness of  this aggregate profile is consistent with significant variation in  the behavior individual neurons on different occasions on which the intention is realized.  Note that to the extent that the (or a) crucial variable in the encoding of intention is firing rate​[21]​,  this seems to open up the  theoretical possibility that some variations in the behavior of individual  neurons that are consistent with their  realizing the same aggregate function  of   neural firing rates  will not be relevant to which intention is represented.  To the extent this is so,  it will be possible for the same intention to be “multiply realized” on different occasions.   In what follows, I  will  assume  that such multiple realization sometimes occurs and will explore  some implications of this assumption.  
Assume then  that some particular (individual or token) pattern of firing N11 in the relevant set of neurons  realizes or encodes the intention I1 to reach for a particular goal on some particular occasion. Call the latter action R1. Assume that there are other token patterns of neural firing, N12, N13 etc. that would have realized the same intention I1. The preference for micro or fine - grained causation we are considering recommends in this case that we should regard N11 as the real cause of R1 on this occasion. But this seems wrong for the same reason it seems wrong to say that it is the scarlet color of the target that causes the pigeon to peck in circumstances in which the pigeon will peck at any red target. What we are interested in explaining (finding the cause of) is variations in reach toward different goal objects – why the monkey exhibits reaching behavior R1 rather than different reaching behavior R2. To explain this explanandum we need to identify states or conditions, variations in which, when produced by interventions, would be stably correlated with changes from R1 to R2.   Ex hypothesi, merely citing N11 does not accomplish this, since it tells us nothing about the conditions under which alternatives to R1 would be realized.  This is because many variations on N11 (N12, N13 etc.) are consistent with I1 and hence will lead to R1, rather than some alternative to R1 , and the proposed explanation which appeals just to N11 does not tell us which of these variations on N11 will  lead to alternatives to R1 and which will not. By way of contrast, both appealing to the monkey’s intentions and appealing  to the abstract facts about patterns of neural firing  that distinguish the encoding of one intention from the encoding of a distinct intention   will accomplish this: it is the fact that the monkey has intention I1 rather than intention 12 that causes behavior R1 rather than R2. Similarly, it is the fact that the PRR exhibits the pattern of neural firing P1 rather than the different pattern of firing P2 (which encodes a distinct intention) that causes the monkey to exhibit R1 rather than R2.​[22]​
  The general form of this solution to the problem of how mental (and other “upper level) properties can play a causal role is not original with me. Broadly similar proposals have been advanced by Yablo and by Pettit and Jackson (1990)​[23]​, among others. Yablo  describes his solution in terms of the  requirement that causes fit with or be “proportional” to their effects – that they be just “enough” for their effects, neither omitting too much relevant detail nor containing  too much irrelevant detail. In this terminology, I1 fits with or is proportional to R1 in a way that N11 does (is) not.  Similarly, on the assumption that the pigeon responds to all and only red targets, the redness of the target fits with the effect of pecking in a way that the scarlet color does not.  However, Yablo’s treatment relies heavily on essentialist metaphysics in explaining what is involved in a cause being proportional to its effect. I think that this essentialist metaphysics is not necessary and that in explicating the intuition behind the requirement of proportionality one need only appeal to the framework in Section 1—an interventionist account of causation, contrastive focus, and so on. 
In the cases considered so far, certain candidates for causes are too detailed or specific for the effects we want explained – in this sense, they are at the wrong “level” for their effects. Interestingly, a failure of proportionality (or a mismatch of levels) between cause and effect can occur in other ways as well:  another possibility is  that the candidate effect is too specific for the cause. An illustration is provided by two thought experiments of Kendler’s:     
[Suppose that] defects in gene X produce such profound mental retardation that affected individuals never develop speech. Is X a gene for language? 
[Suppose that] a research group has localized a gene that controls development of perfect pitch. Assuming that individuals with perfect pitch tend to particularly appreciate the music of Mozart, should they declare that they have found a gene for liking Mozart? (Kendler, 2005) 
In both cases, Kendler’s view is that the answers to these questions is “no”.  I agree.  The defects in gene X are better described as causing mental retardation – muteness is an insufficiently general (overly specific) description of what the defects cause.  Similarly the gene in scenario 2 is better described as a gene for perfect pitch or for pitch perception—again “liking Mozart” is a too specific effect. 
  The interventionist account provides a natural justification for these judgments. In  the first scenario,  changes in whether gene X is defective or not (that is, changes that replace the normal form of the gene with a defective form and vice-versa) are associated not just with changes in the ability to speak but with many other changes as well – in the ability to read, do mathematics, live independently and so on. In describing the effect of variations in gene X, we prefer a characterization that captures the fact that such variations are associated with all of these other changes as well, and which presents such information in a parsimonious way,  revealing what all these more specific consequences   have in common.  Thinking of the defects in the gene as causing mental retardation provides more information regarding the answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions than if we think of the defect in the gene as causing muteness. Similarly for the gene that influences pitch perception-- indeed in this case the fit between the gene and the “effect” of liking Mozart is even more imperfect than in the previous case.    Even assuming that those with the gene are more likely to like Mozart, whether they do so will depend on much else besides possession of the gene – e.g., on the sort of music to which they are exposed. In this sense the gene liking Mozart relationship is like Dawkins’ gene reading relationship in being comparatively unstable or non-invariant.  Moreover the relationship between lacking the gene and not liking Mozart is also unstable in that many people who lack the gene will still like Mozart. 
Note again that it is crucial to this whole line of argument that we not think of causes simply as nomologically sufficient conditions or as conjuncts in such conditions and that we not think of causal explanation as simply DN explanation. The defect in gene X in the first scenario is nomologically sufficient for muteness and we can construct a DN explanation for a subject’s muteness by appealing to this generalization. The insight that there is nonetheless something misleading about the claim that defects in gene X cause muteness requires for its motivation the different way of thinking about causation and causal explanation outlined in section 1, according to which causal explanation has to do with the accurate exhibition of systematic patterns of dependency between explanans and explanandum.  It is the limitations of “defects in gene X cause muteness”   along this last dimension that explain its inadequacy as an explanation 
We can bring this point out in a slightly different way by returning to the research   conducted by Andersen et al. and asking what it would look like if its focus or goal were simply the identification of   conditions that are nomologically sufficient for the production of reaching behavior.  If this were the goal, it would be acceptable to cite the entire state of the whole brain (or any part of it that includes the PRR as a proper part) during the time immediately preceding the behavior of interest, for this will assuredly be  a nomologically sufficient condition for the behavior, if anything is. Of course, neither Andersen nor any other  neuroscientist does this. Andersen’s goal, as he puts it, is to identify “intention specific” neurons—that is to identify the specific neurons or collections of neurons variations in the state of which correlate with the monkey’s intentions and which hence are responsible for or make a difference for the monkey’s behavior. Then, among these neurons, he wants to identify those specific features of their behavior (whether this has to do with some aggregate function of spike rate or whatever) which encode different intentions. Other states of the monkey’s brain in, e.g., occipital cortex that don’t covary with changes in the monkey’s intentions are irrelevant to this task and hence are ignored. This concern with neural specificity falls naturally out of a concern with causal relevance or with the identification of conditions that make a difference   for the behavior of interest but is lost if we focus just on the identification of nomologically sufficient conditions for that behavior.   
4.
In my discussion so far I have rejected various arguments designed to show that mental and other upper level properties are casually inert. In the remainder of this essay, I want to shift perspective  somewhat and explore some other considerations, less discussed in the philosophical literature, that bear on the causal role of upper level properties, but which in contrast to the arguments surveyed in section 3 do sometimes provide reasons for preferring lower level of more micro level causal explanations. Again, many of my examples will concern mental properties but my discussion will have implications for other sorts of macro-properties as well. The considerations on which I will focus do not undercut any possible causal role for the mental in the way that the   arguments surveyed in section 3 (if correct) would. However, they do suggest various ways in which, depending on the empirical details of the case, mental (and certain other upper level) causal claims may turn out to be less illuminating or satisfactory from the point of achieving scientific understanding than causal claims involving  lower level relationships 
	4.1. Causal Heterogeneity. The first possibility I want to explore can be introduced by means of an example, recently discussed by Sheines and Spirtes (2004). Prior to the  discovery of the difference between HDL cholesterol  and LDL cholesterol, investigators thought in terms of a category which we would now describe as total cholesterol (TC),  understood as the sum of HDL (H) and LDL (L) cholesterol levels. Investigators were interested in the causal impact of TC on heart disease D, and concluded that higher TC levels caused higher probability of D.   Only later was it recognized that H and L have quite different causal influences on D, with the latter increasing the probability of D and former acting as a preventive of heart disease. Consider an experimental manipulation that increases   TC to some new value TC=c.   There are many different ways of increasing the value of TC— by holding H constant and increasing L ,  by increasing H  and holding L  constant, and so on.   These different manipulations will have quite different effects on D, despite the fact that they involve the same level of TC, depending on the mix of H and L involved.  TC thus might be described as a causally heterogeneous variable with respect to D; the effect of a given level of TC on D will depend on how TC is realized. (Spirtes and Scheines say that this is a case in which  manipulations of TC are “ambiguous”). To the extent that in different experimental manipulations the same level of TC is achieved by different mixtures of H and L, this ambiguity/heterogeneity will show up in an instability in the relationship between TC and D.
	The possibility that I want to consider is that this sort of phenomenon may be quite common in connection with many macro-level variables in the social and psychological realms, including mental variables. We have already encountered one possible instance in section 1, where we considered the possibility that different realizations of the SES variable might have quite different effects on mental illness.   As another illustration, consider a causal model in which one attempts to determine the effect of the subject’s educational level or whether subject is divorced on some other macroscopic variable -- e.g.  delinquency of children or depression. If, educational level E is measured by, e.g., years of schooling, then it is plausible that this variable may have a quite different impact on other behavioral variables, depending on how E is realized—the same number of years in school may involve educations of quite different quality and so on and these may have rather different effects. Similarly, “divorce” may have a quite different causal impact on other variables depending on how the divorce is “realized” – acrimonious divorces may have very different consequences for childhood delinquency than more amiable divorces.
	It seems entirely possible that a similar pattern will sometimes hold for causal claims involving mental states. Suppose, for example, that the same belief B1 is sometimes realized by neural structure N11 and sometimes by neural structure N12—B1 is the same belief under these two realizations in the sense that whatever procedures we have for attributing and individuating beliefs don’t in themselves lead us to make any distinctions among beliefs that are realized in these quite different ways. If N11 tends to cause behavior R11 and N12 causes behavior R12 where R11 and R12 are mutually exclusive, B1   will have a different casual impact on behavior depending on how it is realized neurally. B1 may either encourage or discourage behavior R11, depending on how B1 is realized neurally
	Note that these possibilities are very different from the possibilities that concerned us in Section 3. There it was assumed that (a) some mental state B1 has disparate neural realizations but (b) all of these are associated with or followed by the same second mental state or behavior B2—the question was whether the sorts of considerations that underlie the exclusion and related arguments show that B1 cannot cause B2. Now we are considering the possibility that although (a) is true, (b) is false—the different realizations of B1 cause different subsequent mental states or behaviors. 
	It seems plausible that this sometimes happens in the psychological realm. If a mental state can have very disparate neural realizations, why should we expect that all of these realizations will have the same causal homogenous impact on some other mental or behavioral variable of interest? Reinforcing this possibility is the commonplace observation that causation in the mental realm often exhibits apparent indeterminism or instability of results. What looks like the same or very similar sets  of beliefs, desires, emotions etc. can lead to different subsequent mental states or behaviors. One (but not the only – see below) possible explanation of this is that these mental states have causally heterogeneous realizers in the way just described.
	As a possible​[24]​ real-life illustration, consider the significance of the discovery of distinct, dissociable fear systems for the etiology of psychopathy. The background is the so-called fear modulation hypothesis (Blair, Mitchell, and Blair, 2005) according to which psychopathy is the result of impairment in the systems  involved in the learning of appropriate responses to fear-inducing or aversive stimuli: the psychopath fails to acquire normal patterns of pro-social behavior because he lacks the fearful response to the threat of punishment on which the acquisition of such behavior depends.  This hypothesis comports with the observation that psychopaths seem to be much less fearful than normals, but fits much less well with other data: for example, there is considerable evidence that successful moral socialization in normal individuals is not based on the threat of punishment as the fear modulation hypothesis apparently requires, but instead on the learning of empathetic responses toward potential victims. Moreover, the fear modulation hypothesis has no obvious explanation for the empathy deficits and poor emotional learning that psychopaths exhibit. Finally, and most crucially for our purposes, the hypothesis in effect assumes that there is a unitary fear system that is impaired in psychopaths.  However, there is considerable evidence that humans possess a number of dissociable neural systems that are involved in fear processing and acquisition of responses to aversive stimuli. Moreover, psychopaths are impaired in some kinds  of tasks involving fear based conditioning/ learning but not others—in particular, they  are impaired on passive avoidance learning ( in which subjects must learn to respond to “good” stimuli and avoid responding to “bad” stimuli)  and more generally on tasks that involve the formation of associations between conditional stimuli and “affective representations” , but not on punishment based instrumental learning tasks  that rely on stimulus response associations.   Normal performance in the former tasks but not on the latter is dependent on the integrity of the amygdala and, according to Blair et al., amygdala damage is very common in psychopaths. 
These observations suggest a more specific hypothesis (called by Blair et al, the Integrated Emotional Systems model or IES) about the kinds of fear/aversive stimuli processing that are impaired in psychopaths – that the relevant impairments have to do with learning to associate affect-based representations of the badness of moral transgressions with aversive stimuli connected with victim’s distress. Roughly the idea is that an intact amygdala in normal individuals allows them to learn to associate moral trangressions with aversive stimuli in the form of fear, sadness etc. of the person transgressed against and hence to learn to avoid such transgression. In psychopaths amygdala dysfunction prevents the learning of such associations.
My concern here is not with whether the IES model is correct but rather with the general strategy that it implements, which consists in taking the causal factor (a general deficit in the system processing fearful or aversive stimuli F) originally proposed as playing a role in the etiology of psychopathy P and replacing it with a more fine grained factor F* involving deficits in just certain specific components in this system but not others. If Blair et al are correct in their empirical claims, this is a case in which F  is a causally heterogeneous variable with respect to P (since some but not all subjects with impairment in fear-based learning exhibit P)   and a better explanation is achieved by descending to a more fine-grained level of analysis which requires neuro-anatomical information (about dysfunction in certain nuclei in the amygdala) for its specification. As in the total cholesterol example, the more fine-grained variable F* has   more stable and reproducible effects on P than the more coarse-grained variable F.​[25]​ 
In my sketch of an interventionist account of causation in Section 1, I in effect noted (although I did not explicitly put it this way) that causal claims and explanations are subject to at least two desiderata. On the one hand, we want causal claims to capture the full range of changes in the cause that are relevant to the effect. On the other hand, we also want the relationships between the cause and effect variables to be relatively stable– to hold under some substantial range of interventions and changes in background conditions. In the examples in Section 3 designed to illustrate the idea that there is no automatic preference for more fine-grained or lower level causal claims, we assumed that the upper level or more macro causal claims were relatively stable and not subject to problems like causal heterogeneity—in other words, we set up the examples so that these two desiderata were not in conflict. For example, we assumed that the red target—> pigeon pecking relationship was no more or less stable than the scarlet—> pecking relationship. Since the former captured a dependency relationship that was omitted by the latter – that the pigeon would peck in response to non-scarlet shades of red – there was an obvious motive for preferring “red” to “scarlet” as a cause of pecking. 
We now see, however, that many real life examples involving upper level casual claims may have a more complex structure: the upper level claim may do a better job of capturing a wider and more general range of dependency relationships than more fine-grained causal claims but it may also be less stable or invariant than the more fine-grained claims. So the two desiderata can come into conflict or be in tension with one another, although whether they actually will be in conflict depends on the details of the case before us.
As an illustration, consider again a theory involving a macro-level variable like “humiliation”    as a potential cause of, e.g. depression. It seems uncontroversial that “humiliation” will be multiply realized at a more fine-grained level—call these realizers N1, N2 etc. If the argument of Sections 3 is correct, this multiple realization per se is no bar at all to attributing a causal role to humiliation. Indeed, arguing in parallel with the examples in section 3, we see that if we insist that the true cause of depression on some specific occasion is the realizer N1 on that occasion, rather than “humiliation”, we are being misleadingly and overly specific, as long as it is true that the other ways of realizing humiliation (e.g. via N2) would have had the same impact on depression. However, we should also appreciate that the italicized phrase contains a major assumption that may well not be satisfied. It may instead be true that some of the different ways of realizing “humiliation” have quite different causal impacts on depression and mental health. To the extent that “humiliation” behaves like “total cholesterol” or “fear” as a causal variable, we have a motive for fragmenting that variable into more  fine –grained subunits  or categories that more stable or uniform effects on mental health. We thus may well find ourselves pulled in two different directions, with our interest in generality (as well as sheer ignorance of the relevant fine-grained realizations) prompting us to employ coarse-grained generalizations involving variables like “humiliation”,   while our interest in finding generalizations that describe more stable and uniform effects (and the greater possibilities of control these afford) instead pull us in the direction of more fine-grained, micro-categories​[26]​. In this sort of situation (which I suspect is quite common in the psychological and social sciences) I see no reason to suppose that there must be some single right way of striking the balance between these two sets of considerations. Instead, it will be more reasonable to construct a plurality of different   models or representations of causal relationships, embodying different trade-offs, and appropriate for different purposes.   
4.2. Instability Again. So far I have focused on the possibility that variables describing macro-level causes   may be causally heterogeneous in the sense that different realizations of the same value of that variable may have different effects on some macroscopic effect variable, even when those macroscopic variables are realized in the same background circumstances (that is, from the point of view of macroscopic description.) However, there is a second possibility, already encountered, that may also lead to a preference for explanation in terms of “lower level” variables, especially in the psychological realm.  Consider a macroscopic variable C and assume that at least in some appropriate set of background circumstances B1, the different realizers of C have a uniform effect on some second macroscopic variable E, so that causal heterogeneity, as defined above, is not a problem. Suppose, however, that the relationship between C and E, although genuinely causal in the sense that E changes in a reproducible way under interventions on C is highly   unstable or sensitive in the sense described in section 1: specifically assume that the relationship C E relationship will fail to hold in many other possible background circumstances B2,…Bn which are alternatives to B1.      
We have already considered several examples having this structure in section 1. The possibility that I now want to briefly raise is that some or even many causal generalizations involving mental states or psychological states, including perhaps especially many of those taken to characterize common sense psychology, may have a similar character—they may describe genuine causal relationships, but it may be that these relationships   are rather unstable and   hold only under a very limited range of interventions and background circumstances.  Moreover, it may be that we are unlikely to succeed in making them more stable just by refining them using concepts   drawn from common sense psychology or everyday “mentalistic” talk. To the extent that they are relatively unstable, such “mental cause” relationships will strike us as not very deep or illuminating from the point of view of explanation.   Again finding more stable relationships may require descent to a more fine-grained, perhaps neural level.   (In saying that I wish to raise this as a possibility I mean just that  -- not that we have conclusive reasons to think that  most mental cause generalizations are unstable, but instead merely that this is an empirical issue that needs to be investigated on a case- by-case basis.)   
To illustrate what I have in mind, consider some of the candidates for causal relationships (often, indeed, described as “laws”)   which philosophers of psychology have proposed
1)	If S believes that p and believes that p implies q, then, ceteris paribus, S will believe that q.
2)	If S wants that p, and believes that –p unless q, and S believes that it is within his power to bring it about that q, then ceteris paribus S brings it about that q (cf. Fodor, 1987, p. 13) . That is, (in English) if someone wants p and thinks that they won’t get p unless they do something else q and they also think they can do q, then, other things being equal, they will do q.
The distinctive feature of these generalizations is not (or not just) that they have some exceptions – as we have noted this is true as well of many relatively stable generalizations. It is rather that these generalizations seem to be (although arguably causal) very unstable: if they are to hold at all, a very elaborate and specific set of background conditions has to be in place. These background conditions include both other beliefs and desires and physiological conditions that it may be difficult to specify in psychological terms. Change these background conditions very much and these generalizations will no longer hold. Moreover, we find it very hard to specify in a non-trivial way what the background conditions must be like for these generalizations to hold. In the case of 1), for example, one of these conditions is that S must “notice” the connection between his two beliefs and perhaps be motivated to “use them together” as premises in an inference whose conclusion is q.  (Needless to say, we do not come to believe all possible conclusions that follow from arbitrary conjunctions of our beliefs) Another possibility that must somehow be excluded is that S does not come to believe  that q is false on other grounds (e.g. by inferring  this from some independently believed premise r) and then use this fact to reject his belief in  p or his belief that p implies q. And so on.  In the case of 2) there is the obvious relevance of S’s other preferences, which may preclude bringing about q etc.
As I have remarked, the fact that generalizations like (1)-(2) have exceptions is not news and is recognized by all – philosophers of psychology acknowledge this point when they formulate these generalizations with ceteris paribus clauses.    The issue I want to raise might be framed as follows: where, along the continuum of relative stability are generalizations like (1-2) located?     This is of course  an empirical question but one  might think that to the extent that various mental cause generalizations are located near the unstable end of the continuum (that is, to the extent they are like  gene Z reading relationship described above), the prospects of incorporating them into a deep explanatory theory do not look good.  Put slightly differently, the  problem with (1-2) may not be, as causal exclusion type arguments contend, that  beliefs and desires are inevitably causally inert, but rather that  as a matter of contingent, empirical fact,  the generalizations in which they figure often turn out to be unstable, with the  relatively stable generalizations  found only at more fine-grained levels.  
 	4.3. The Causal Efficacy of Individual Beliefs. Let me conclude with a final, related issue, also bearing on the causal role of the mental. As we have seen, within an interventionist framework for a variable to qualify as a well-defined causal variable, it must make sense to think in terms   of an intervention that changes the value of that variable in a surgical way.   So if we wish to attribute causal efficacy to individual   beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental states, there must be a well-defined notion of   intervention with respect to these.  
	Suppose  that we are interested in the casual relationship, if any, between your desire D to drink a beer and your action A of opening the refrigerator door or between your belief B that there is beer in the refrigerator and A. Recall that an intervention I on X should not at the same time change the value of other variables that do not lie on the causal route from I to X to its putative cause Y and that may affect Y via some other route. This means that interventions on B and D should not change other beliefs and desires that affect A via some independent route.  Given the apparent holism of mental state ascription, one might well worry that in many realistic cases this will not be possible (or at least that it will be very difficult to tell whether this condition is satisfied). Suppose that your belief B changes because (C) I tell you that there is beer in the refrigerator. Almost certainly C will change many of your other beliefs and desires besides B.  For example, you will probably also come to believe that I believe that there is beer in refrigerator (unless you think that I am trying to deceive you), you will probably come to believe that I have a refrigerator, in many contexts you will come to believe that I want you to have one of the beers, you may acquire a  desire to drink  that you did  not previously have  so as not to appear unsociable and so on.   Moreover, these additional beliefs and desires may well affect A via a route that does not go through B or, alternatively, the whole issue of what the independent routes are by which C affects A (and afortiori whether these routes include B) may seem ill-defined.  In other words, it may be simply unclear whether or not we are faced with a situation with the following structure:
Figure 3 here
Put slightly differently,  it appears that there  will be a number of cases in which it is not clear that it makes sense, even as a thought experiment, to imagine changing only a single belief or desire and only what lies causally downstream from it. Moreover, our understanding of the causal relationships among our beliefs, desires and actions often  does not seem  precise or articulated enough to go about determining whether  changes in some of these variables do or do not affect other variables via independent routes  in a way that is inconsistent with the requirements on interventions.
If   correct, I do not think these considerations (by themselves) undermine the claim that mental or psychological states can be causally efficacious. However, I do think that they suggest (even if they do not conclusively establish) that a certain popular philosophical picture of how common sense psychological explanation works   is misguided. According to this picture,  associated with philosophers  like Fodor, it makes sense to talk of the causal role or impact of  individual beliefs, desires and so on, taken in isolation – causal explanation in folk psychology consists in  tracing changes in mental states and behavior back to the specific individual beliefs/desires etc. that were efficacious in producing these outcomes. An interventionist account of causation seems to suggest instead that to the extent that there is such a thing as psychological causation at all, often a rather different picture will be more appropriate, according to which it is whole clumps or groups of beliefs /desires etc. taken together that do the causing, with no possibility of making further distinctions among these as to the exact details of their causal contribution. On this sort of picture  it still makes sense to suppose, for example,  that if patients change their thought patterns so that they entertain fewer   self critical thoughts, this  can cause changes in mood and the alleviation in depression, but the causal actor, so to speak, in this (and what is changed by the therapist’s or patient’s own intervention) will be the change of overall thought pattern taken as a whole—it will usually not make sense to ask whether the lifting of depression is attributable to this or that individual thought as entertained on some specific occasion.   
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^1	 1 Talk of “levels” in psychological and other contexts is extremely common, but (I readily acknowledge)   fraught with ambiguity and the potential for confusion. Unfortunately, sorting out the many different meanings of “level” and what is defensible in these notions is itself a project for a very long paper. In what follows, I will try to get by   exploiting what I hope is a shared common sense  understanding  of what “level” amounts to in the context of particular examples.  I would be the first to agree, however, that this notion deserves much more careful philosophical scrutiny. 
^2	  Another logical possibility is that the correlation between SES and mental illness is due to some common cause or causes.
^3	  These relationships between the social causation and social selection hypotheses  and what would happen under various hypothetical interventions are exploited in a very interesting “natural experiment” reported in Costello, Compton, Keeler and Angold, 2003. These authors investigated the relationship between the  opening of a casino on an American Indian reservation  and psychopathology in children. The opening resulted in a substantial increase in the income of some  poor families in the   sample, while leaving others  poor and non-poor families unaffected.  According to the authors, this income increase was not correlated with or caused by  pre-existing psychological conditions in the children or by other family characteristics that could affect the children’s psychological condition independently of income. In other words, the income increase had the characteristics of an intervention. Hence the social causation hypothesis predicts that childhood psychopathology   will decrease under this intervention, while the social selection theory predicts that there will be no change. In fact what Costello et al. found was that in their sample the income increase had a major effect on some psychiatric disorders (conduct and oppositional disorders) but not others (anxiety and depression). 
^4	  Although not inaccurate, this claim involves a major simplification. A more general characterization of the causal claims made by path diagrams and other structural equation models would distinguish claims about total and about direct causes.   An arrow from one variable X directed into a second variable Y means that X is a direct cause of Y;  within an interventionist framework this is cashed out in terms of the claim that Y will change under some intervention on X when all other variables in the system are fixed at some value by means of independent interventions. X is a total cause of Y when X has a non-null effect on Y when one sums over all paths connecting X and Y; this corresponds to whether Y will change under an intervention on X alone. The two notions coincide when there is an arrow from X to Y and this   then only   path from X to Y, as in the example under discussion.
^5	   See Muntaner et al. 2004.  Moreover, there is reason to think that “occupation”  itself fragments into several variables with distinct causal  impacts on health.   There is a status component to occupation that varies at least somewhat independently of whether one is in a position of subordination to others.  Subordination  appears to have an  effect on mental and physical health that is independent of status. 
^6	  Example due to Peter Machamer.
^7	  Explanans is  a philosophical term of art for whatever does the explaining in an explanation; the explanandum is what is explained. 
^8	  I take this example from Murphy, 2006 who uses it to make a similar point. 
^9	  For additional discussion of the distinction between stability (or invariance) and scope, see MTH, pp 268 ff. See also section 4.3 below for related discussion.
^10	  See Lotrich and Pollock, 2004 for additional discussion. This meta-analysis concludes that there is evidence  for  a small effect of 5-HTTLPR on monopolar and perhaps bipolar depression with an OR of less than 1.2.
^11	  Talk of generalizations as more or less stable naturally raises the following question: what sorts of changes in background conditions matter for the assessment of stability? This is a large question and I can only gesture at answer here, referring the reader to MTH and to Woodward, forthcoming for additional discussion. But, to an important extent, the conditions relevant to the assessment of stability will be discipline specific. For example, in psychology/psychiatry there is a prima facie expectation that fundamental explanatory principles should be stable under changes in learning history or information available to the subject. This does not mean of course that subject’s behavior etc. should not vary depending on changes in learning but rather that the generalizations governing learning should be stable under such changes, as the Rescola- Wagner rule at least purports to be and the generalization PECK transparently is not. That is, one should be able to take the same generalization governing learning and combine it with information about different possible learning histories, showing how these lead to different outputs. Similarly, one expects that fundamental explanatory principles will be stable under changes in subject’s beliefs and goals or preferences. As  some readers may recognize, these criteria are  loosely reminiscent to Pylyshyn’s (1984) use of “cognitive impenetrability” as a criterion for distinguishing the “functional architecture” of the mind (roughly, those properties that derive from the structure of the underlying machine) from those processes that are to be explained in terms of rules and representations: roughly, Pylyshyn requires that the “behavior” of “components” of the functional architecture  be stable under changes in a subject’s beliefs and goals . (p. 133).   But my view contrasts with Pylyshyn’s in holding that we would apply this stability criterion to psychological relationships/generalizations (rather than components). For example, in connection with a generalization like “If S believes p and believes that if p, then q, the S will believe q” my suggestion is that we should ask whether this generalization would continue to hold under changes in S’s other beliefs etc. (In addition, I do not share Pylyshyn’s concern with distinguishing what is explicable by reference to functional architecture from what should be explained in terms of rules and representations.)	
^12	  Another example: the generalization (1.7.1) “If you push the key on the key board of Woodward’s computer that is labeled “Z”, a Z will show up on the computer screen” is, according to writers like Fodor, a ceteris paribus law. So also are (1.7. 2) the fundamental principles of electrical engineering, transistor and circuit behavior etc. that govern the operation of my computer’s components. Needless to say, however, the latter (1.7.2) are usually though to provide a deeper and more fundamental explanation of the behavior of my computer than a list of input/output relations along the lines of (1.7.1). The interventionist account traces the greater explanatory depth of (1.7.2) in part to their greater stability.  From the point of view of psychology/psychiatry the operative question we should be asking about candidate causal generalizations is whether they look more like (1.7.1) or (1.7. 2) with respect to degree of stability, not whether they qualify as ceteris paribus laws. If a candidate psychological generalization is comparable in stability to (1.7.1), this will not count as much of a vindication of its explanatory credentials.  
^13	  In standard philosophy of science terminology, the explanandum is a sentence of proposition describing or representing the phenomenon being explained, rather than the phenomenon itself. However, it is cumbersome to write “explandandum outcome” so I will sometimes just use “explanandum” to refer  to the outcome itself, trusting that the   resulting conflation of use and mention will not lead to any serious confusion.
^14	  One set of properties, A, is said to supervene on another, B, (the supervenience base of A) if necessarily, any change or difference in A requires a change or difference in B. Mental properties are widely believed to supervene on physical or neural properties in this sense -- that is, if two organisms differ in their mental properties or states they must also differ in their physical states.
^15	  This conclusion is a non-sequitur: there is nothing in the idea of multiple realizability per se that rules out the possibility that all of the different realizers share some common physical structure at an abstract level of description. For example, different realizations of the same intention may share some aggregate feature that is a function of firing rates exhibited by a group of neurons, just as the same temperature may be realized by a variety of molecular configurations, all of which possess the same average kinetic energy. (cf. the discussion of Andersen below). Since my interest here is just in describing the background assumptions that philosophers of mind bring to this discussion, I will ignore this complication.  
^16	  Very roughly, the Putnam-Fodor argument was that because of multiple realizability, there will be unifying higher level generalizations that are not “captured” by generalizations that just concern the very disparate lower level realizers. For example, suppose that (C1) the belief that p, (C2) the belief that if p, then q, and (C3) the belief that q can be realized in many different ways—in neurons, silicon etc. Suppose in addition that (3.1) it is a true causal generalization that instances of C1 and C2 cause instances of C3. Then, the argument goes, information about   lower level realizers and their causal relationships will not capture or reveal the common pattern represented by (3.1) To capture this common pattern, we need upper level generalizations  like (3.1) formulated in terms of properties like belief and desire. From an interventionist perspective, this argument leaves out an important consideration: to vindicate the explanatory credentials of (3.1) it is not enough that there be some instances of C1 and C2 that cause C3 for this is compatible with  (3.1) being highly unstable.  In other words, if C1, C2, and C3 are multiply realizable but (3.1) breaks down under many or most alternative ways of realizing C1 - C3 (because, e.g. these are causally heterogeneous, in the sense described in Section 4 or because (3.1) holds only under very specialized background circumstances for each of its multiple realizations), this will make (3.1) seem unsatisfactory from the point of view of explanation.
^17	  See Kim, 2005 for a detailed development of this argument. My formulation is meant to make it clear how the argument depends on the assumption that a cause is just some condition that is part of a nomologically sufficient condition for its effect. If, as I have suggested, this assumption should be rejected the exclusion argument and its kindred look far less compelling. 
^18	  I’m grateful to Richard Andersen for some very helpful conversations  about this research.
^19	  In more recent research, other variables in addition to firing rate are measured and aggregated. These enable somewhat better prediction of intention   than what is achieved  through reliance on firing rate alone.
^20	  Richard Andersen, personal communication.
^21	  For discussion of the status of this assumption, see Dayan and Abbott, 2001. 
^22	  A recent paper by Briggman, Abarbanel, and  Kristan (2005) provides  a broadly similar illustration.   These authors are interested in the neural structures that control decision-making (in particular the choice between swimming and crawling) in the medicinal leach. One extreme possibility is that such choices are controlled by  a single neuron or a very small group of neurons, another is that they are controlled by the dynamics of whole populations of neurons. The authors find that recording from  populations of neurons allows for earlier prediction of choice than recording  from any single neuron. While  the authors acknowledge   that this evidence is merely correlational, they also (in good interventionist fashion) tried manipulating  (stimulating) individual neurons to see if this would bias decisions, finding only one such neuron.   On  this basis they propose a  “middle ground” position, according to which network dynamics (causally) determines choices  but some individual neurons exert an especially important influence .To the extent that dynamical features of  whole populations of neurons influence choice and these dynamical features can be realized  by different combinations of states of individual neurons,  it will be misleading (on the conception of explanation defended in this essay) to cite  the  just the  states   individual neurons happen to assume on some particular occasion in explaining choice.
^23	  However, Pettit and Jackson distinguish sharply between causal relevance   and what they call causal efficacy, where “a casually efficacious property with regard to an effect is a property in virtue of whose instantiation, at least in part, the effect occurs”. According to Jackson and Petit,   mental states are causally relevant to behavior but not in themselves causally efficacious in producing behavior. Instead it is the particular physical realization of the mental state on a given occasion which is causally efficacious in producing behavior. My contrary view is that this distinction between relevance and efficacy is unwarranted and (roughly) that there is nothing more to causation than causal relevance.
^24	   I emphasize that the example that follows is intended only as  an illustration what is meant by causal heterogeneity. For my purposes, it does not matter whether every aspect of the Blair et al. proposal turns out to be correct. In particular, Ken Kendler   has pointed out to me that Blair et al.’s claim that amygdala dysfunction is  common in psychopaths is not generally accepted.  
^25	  It is  worth noting that just  as candidate causes can be heterogeneous, so also can candidate effects. Blair et al. argue that  the standard diagnostic category of anti-social behavior is like this: it  really consists of two different conditions,  only one of which  corresponds to psychopathy, and these two conditions have very different etiologies. They claim that a more adequate explanation of both conditions thus can be found by splitting them into two more fine-grained conditions, and constructing separate explanations of each. Other examples in psychiatry come readily to mind; the splitting of depression into bipolar and unipolar variants. Some think that schizophrenia is really a heterogeneous family of diseases.  So effect heterogeneity is another consideration that can lead to more fine-grained theorizing. 
^26	  To put the point in a slightly different way, consider two extreme possibilities. According to the first, “humiliation” is with respect to other variables of psychiatric interest like “temperature” is to thermodynamic variables. There are many different ways (different molecular configurations) of realizing the same value for the temperature of a gas and all of these have the same stable effect on variables like pressure and volume.  Insofar as we are interested in explaining the behavior of these latter variables, there is no motivation at all for splitting temperature into many different finer-grained variables corresponding to different micro-realizations. The other extreme possibility is that even very small variations in the micro-realization of humiliation have very different effects in psychiatric variables, in which case we have at least some motivation for subdividing the humiliation variable. Now suppose that the true situation with respect to humiliation is somewhere between these two possibilities.  In this case,  we have some motivation both for splitting (more stable cause-effect relationships) and some motivation for not splitting (greater generality etc.) and there may be no single best way of striking this balance.
